六 结论

我们选择将关注点放在印度比哈尔邦，其原因是比哈尔邦是印度最为贫困的邦之一。如果该计划运行良好，那么在该邦内的计划参与率就比较高，但事实并非如此。实际上，比哈尔邦是全国劳动福利制度计划中参与率最低的邦之一。虽然比哈尔邦的重要性很突出，但是我们不能将比哈尔邦的情况推广到全印度。

我们的结果表明，在这一背景下，劳动福利制度的参与者并非全部来源于未就业者。许多报告放弃的收入，虽然大多是很好的工作收益机会但低于市场工资。平均而言，大约1/3的劳动福利制度工资率都被放弃了。该计划还产生了管理成本和物资成本，大约占到预算的40%。

计算所有的成本因素，我们发现来源于这一大型劳动福利制度计划的额外收益，相对于基本的收入保证——向每个人提供相同资金的统一转移支付，或者向所有持有政府发放的定量供应卡的贫困家庭统一转移支付——对于贫困的影响要小一些。我们主要的定性结果对过高估计放弃收入的可能性是十分稳健的，对于在更大范围内的贫困线的选择也十分稳健。转移计划中资金流失的程度是一个关键的未知数。当我们为转移计划预设20%的资金流失率时，我们关于比哈尔农村就业保证计划相对于其他转移支付选项所起的效果的主要结论同样成立，尽管如果资金流失率很高，劳动福利制度将开始占有优势。

很明确的是，即便在这样一个贫困的劳动力过剩的农村经济体中，这种通过施加工作要求而达成的过于高估的自我定位机制并不能使得天平向效果不佳的劳动福利制度倾斜，而不是选择很少或没有任何目标定位以及有资金流失问题的劳动福利制度项目的现金转移支付计划。

在实践中，是否能够对这一计划进行改革使其更好地发挥作用呢？这样一个计划很难控制放弃的收入。规定的工资率和收到的工资之间的差距可能会减少。有利于穷人的改革也可能会降低该计划大量的工作需求。可以通过提高公共信息和更为灵敏的供应端来实现上述目标；德塔等人（2014）明确了一系列具体的改革。这些改革将加大对贫困的影响，包括对私人劳动力市场工资产生更大的影响。那么对于贫困更大的冲击将以更大的公共预算成本为代价。我们需要在更高的融资水平上，对性价比进行再次评估。

改革的第二个方向就是确定劳动福利制度是有效的——创造的资产对于穷人是有价值的（或非贫困的受益者可以收回成本）。持久资产的创造并没有引起计划倡议者和/或管理者的很多注意。这需要改变。本研究的结果表明，如果创造的资产对于穷人有足够的价值，那么劳动福利制度计划将优于提到的现金转移支付计划。

然而，我们应当指出两种认证。第一，需要存在一种权衡。满足更多的工作需求，未必能够确保这些资产确实具有持续的价值。应对这样一种权衡的公共选择应当基于降低当前与未来贫困的权重。第二，可以使用现金转移来帮助创造资产，也就是通过激励贫困家庭中儿童教育和健康护理来改善人力资源积累；然而，要使第二条路径能良好运行，这些服务的交付系统的有效性是至关重要的。“资产创造劳动福利制度”的性价比需要与此类有条件的现金转移支付进行对比。

参考文献

Alik-Lagrange, A. and M. Ravallion. 2015. “Inconsistent Policy Evaluation: A Case Study for a Large Workfare Program. ”NBERWorking Paper 21041, NBER, Cambridge, Mass.

Atkinson, A. B. and H. Sutherland. 1989. “Analysis of a Partial Basic Income Scheme. ”in A. B.

Atkinson, ed. , Poverty and Social Security. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Azam, M. 2012. “The Impact of Indian Job Guarantee Scheme on Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. ”IZA Discussion Paper No. 6548, Bonn, Germany.

Bardhan, P. 2011. “Challenges for a Minimum Social Democracy in India. ”Economic and Political Weekly 46（10）:39-43.

Berg, E. , S. Bhattacharyya, R. Durgam, and M. Ramachandra. 2012. “Can Rural Public Works Affect Agricultural Wages? Evidence from India. ”Center for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series 2012-05, University of Oxford, Oxford, U. K.

Besley, T. and S. Coate. 1992. “Workfare vs. Welfare: Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty Alleviation Programs. ”American Economic Review 82（1）:249-61.

Besley, T. , R. Pande and V. Rao. 2012. “Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India. ”World Bank Economic Review 26（2）:191-216.

Björklund, A. 1987. “What Experiments are Needed for Manpower Policy? ”Journal of Human Resources 23（2）:267-77.

Datt, G. and M. Ravallion. 1994. “Transfer Benefits from Public Works Employment. ”Economic Journal,104:1346-69.

——. 2002. “Has India's Post-Reform Economic Growth Left the Poor Behind. ”Journal of Economic Perspectives 16（3）:89-108.

Davala, S. , R. Jhabvala, S. Mehta and G. Standing. 2015. Basic Income: A Transformative Policy for India. London and New Delhi: Bloomsbury Academic.

Development Alternatives. 2009. “Report on Scoping Study for Design and Development of Alternative Implementation Model（s）on NREGS. ”Background note prepared for the BREGS study.

Drèze, J. 1990. “Famine Prevention in India, ”in J. Dre｀ze, and A. Sen, eds. , The Political Economy of Hunger. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Volume 2.

——. 2004. “Employment as a Social Responsibility, ”The Hindu, November 22,（http://www.hindu.com/2004/11/22/stories/2004112205071000.htm）.

Dutta, P. , R. Murgai, M. Ravallion and D. van de Walle. 2012. “Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment? ”Economic and Political Weekly 48（April 21）:55-64.

——. 2014. Right-to-Work? Assessing India's Employment Guarantee Scheme in Bihar. Equity and Development Series, World Bank.

Grosh, M. , C. Del Ninno, E. Tesliuc and A. Ouerghi. 2008. For Protection and Promotion. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Heckman, J. and R. Robb. 1985. “Alternative Methods for Evaluating the Impact of Interventions: An Overview. ”Journal of Econometrics 30:239-67.

Heckman, J. S. Urzua and E. Vytlacil. 2006. “Understanding Instrumental Variables in Models with Essential Heterogeneity. ”Review of Economics and Statistics 88（3）:389-432.

Imbert, C. and J. Papp. 2013. “Labor Market Effects of Social Programs: Evidence from India's Employment Guarantee, ”Center for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series 2013-03, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.

Indian Grameen Services. 2009. “Report on Scoping Study for Design and Development of Alternative Implementation Model（s）on NREGS and SGSY. ”Background note prepared for the BREGS study.

Jalan, J. and M. Ravallion. 2003. “Estimating the Benefit Incidence of an Anti-Poverty Program by Propensity-Score Matching. ”Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 21（1）:19-30.

Jha, R. , R. Gaiha and M. K. Pandey. 2012. “Net Transfer Benefits under India's Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. ”Journal of Policy Modeling 34（2）:296-311.

Khera, R. 2011. “Wage Payments: Live Without Pay? ”in R. Khera, ed. , The Battle for Employment Guarantee. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Lewis, A. , 1954. “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor. ”Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 22:139-91.

Lindert, P. H. 2013. “Private Welfare and the Welfare State. ”in Larry Neal, and Jeffrey Williamson, eds. , The Cambridge History of Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, N. and V. Pande. 2012. “Comment on the Validity of the Claim: MGNREGA Builds Assets of Questionable Quality. ”Ideas for India（website）.

Meade, J. 1972. “Poverty in theWelfare State. ”Oxford Economic Papers 24:289-326.

Ministry of Labour and Employment. 2010. Report on Employment and Unemployment Survey（2009-10）, Chandigarh: Government of India.

Neihaus, P. and S. Sukhankar. 2013. “The Marginal Rate of Corruption in Public Programs: Evidence from India. ”Journal of Public Economics 104:52-64.

Ravallion, M. 1991. “Reaching the Rural Poor through Public Employment: Arguments, Evidence, and Lessons from South Asia. ”World Bank Research Observer 6:153-76.

Ravallion, M. and G. Datt. 1995. “Is Targeting through a Work Requirement Efficient? Some Evidence for Rural India, ”in D. van de Walle, and K. Nead, eds. , Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and Evidence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ravallion, M. E. Galasso, T. Lazo, and E. Philipp. 2005. “What Can Ex-participants Reveal about a Program's Impact? ”Journal of Human Resources 40:208-30.

Raventós, D. 2007. Basic Income: The Material Conditions of Freedom. London: Pluto Press.

Rosenzweig, M. 1989. “Labor Markets in Developing Countries, ”in H. Chenery, and T. N. Srinivasan, eds. , Handbook of Development Economics. Vol. 1. Amsterdam: North Holland.

Sunai Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. 2009. “Process Qualitative Observation Report, Feb-Mar 2009, Four Blocks of Muzaffarpur and Saharsa Districts of Bihar. ”Background note prepared for the BREGS study, World Bank, New Delhi.

Thane, P. 2000. Old Age in English History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vanaik, A. 2009. “Accounts of Corruption. ”Frontline 26（1）: Jan. 16, p. 21.

Verma, S. 2011. MGNREGA Assets and Rural Water Security: Synthesis of Field Studies in Bihar, Gujarat, Kerala and Rajasthan. Anand: International Water Management Institute（IW-MI）.

World Bank. 1986. Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing Countries. Washington DC: World Bank.

Zimmerman, L. 2013. “Why Guarantee Employment? Evidence from a Large Indian Public Works Program. ”Mimeo, University of Michigan.